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 THE NEW YORK AGENCY SHOP FEE AND THE
 CONSTITUTION AFTER ELLIS AND HUDSON
 RICHARD BRIFFAULT*
 In its recent Ellis and Hudson decisions, the Supreme Court imposed
 new substantive restrictions and procedural requirements on states that
 authorize, and public employee unions that utilize, agency shop fees.
 Focusing on New York State, this study analyzes the consequences for
 the collection and expenditure of agency fees of the Supreme Court's
 new emphasis on the First Amendment basis for dissenting employees'
 rights. The author finds that Ellis and Hudson cast doubt on the
 constitutionality of some current agency fee practices. He concludes that
 New York's Public Employment Relations Board will have to take a more
 active role in policing agency fee standards and procedures than it has
 until now if the agency fee in New York is to withstand First
 Amendment scrutiny.
 T HE AGENCY shop fee is a device used by
 many American labor unions to ensure
 that they receive appropriate financial sup-
 port from the workers they represent. As
 collective negotiating representatives, unions
 win benefits that by their very nature ordi-
 narily cannot be withheld from any particu-
 lar worker in the group represented (Olson
 1965:66-67). Moreover, most labor laws im-
 pose duties of fair representation that pro-
 hibit unions from discriminating among
 workers; thus, unions are unable to limit the
 benefits they obtain for a bargaining unit to
 union supporters. It follows that "most of
 the achievements of a union, even if they
 were more impressive than the staunchest
 unionist claims," would offer the rational in-
 dividual worker little incentive to join or pay
 dues, since whether or not he supports the
 union he would still get the benefits of the
 union's work (Olson 1965:76). The agency
 * The author is Associate Professor of Law at
 Columbia University. The New York Public Employ-
 ment Relations Board provided financial support for
 some of the research for this paper.
 shop, which requires nonunion workers in a
 bargaining unit to remit to the union a sum
 comparable to union dues, serves to compel
 the beneficiaries of labor union activity to
 pay for the benefits they receive.
 The agency shop, however, has become
 fraught with constitutional difficulty. The
 First Amendment's protection of freedom
 of conscience and association includes the
 right to refuse to associate and the right to
 refrain from supporting objectionable
 views. Many employees want no part of
 unions, and oppose the goals of union
 expenditures. In the public sector, the
 Supreme Court has found that state
 authorization to unions to obtain agency
 fees from public employees, and state
 involvement in fee collection through
 payroll deductions and payments to unions,
 implicate those employees' First Amend-
 ment interests.
 The Supreme Court has sought to
 reconcile the individual nonunion employ-
 ee's First Amendment interest in avoiding
 an objectionable association with the
 union's collective interest in obtaining
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 financial support from all represented
 workers. In Abood v. Detroit Board of
 Education,I the Court held that agency fees
 may be validly collected from public
 employees and expended for union pur-
 poses subject to certain constitutionally
 mandated limitations. Consistent with
 Abood, many states have authorized some
 form of agency fee for unions represent-
 ing their public employees (Rehmus and
 Kerner 1980).
 The Supreme Court recently handed
 down two important rulings-Ellis v. Rail-
 way Clerks2 and Chicago Teachers Union,
 Local No. 1 v. Hudson3-that clarify points
 that were ambiguous in the prior case law
 and tighten restrictions on a state's power
 to authorize unions to receive and use
 agency fee payments. As a result, the
 constitutionality of many state agency fee
 arrangements may be in question.
 This paper examines the constitutional-
 ity of New York's agency shop fee law in
 light of Ellis and Hudson. The New York
 law was adopted in 1977, the year of the
 Abood decision. The statutory terms and
 conditions regulating the collection and
 use of the fee reflect the state legislature's
 understanding of the constitutional limita-
 tions imposed by Abood.4 The New York
 State Public Employment Relations Board
 (PERB), in decisions applying the statute
 to specific fee arrangements, has, until
 very recently, interpreted the statute ac-
 cording to the same understanding.
 I believe that an examination of New
 York State's experiences may help make
 clear the implications of Ellis and Hudson
 for other state labor agencies and unions.
 This study may also help reveal the
 emerging vision of nonunion employee
 rights implicit in those two decisions.
 The Constitutional Framework for
 the Agency Shop Fee
 The Supreme Court has framed its
 constitutional analysis of the agency shop
 1431 U.S. 209 (1977).
 2 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
 3 U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
 4Leemhuis v. PERB, 121 AD2d 796, 797 (3d Dept.
 1986).
 fee around two major principles.5 First,
 Congress or a state legislature may legiti-
 mately authorize a union to collect fees
 comparable to union dues from employees
 who are not members of the union but
 who share the benefits of union represen-
 tation. This is the anti-"free rider" princi-
 ple. As initially developed under the
 Railway Labor Act and subsequently ex-
 tended to state and local employees, this
 principle enables unions to collect fees
 necessary to defray the costs of negotiat-
 ing and administering collective bargain-
 ing agreements and adjusting and settling
 grievances. The Court reasoned that since
 Congress or a state could legitimately seek
 to promote labor peace through collective
 bargaining based on exclusive representa-
 tion, lawmakers could with equal legiti-
 macy seek to bolster collective bargaining
 by using the agency fee to prevent free
 riders.6 Although the compulsory pay-
 ment of a fee to a union "might well be
 thought . . . to interfere in some way with
 an employee's freedom to associate . . . or
 to refrain from doing so . . . such
 interference as exists is constitutionally
 justified by the legislative assessment of
 the important contribution" of the agency
 shop to the system of labor relations.7
 Second, the First Amendment precludes
 government authorization of union expen-
 diture of agency shop fees for political and
 5 First Amendment questions arise only in the
 context of government action; consequently, an
 agency shop agreement entered into between a
 private sector employer and a union will ordinarily
 not present a constitutional issue. See, e.g., Price v.
 United Automobile Workers, 795 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir.
 1986); but cf. Beck v. Communications Workers, 800 F.
 2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986).
 The first three Supreme Court cases that consid-
 ered agency shop fee arrangements arose under the
 federal Railway Labor Act. Although that Act affects
 only private employees, the Court has interpreted it
 as promoting rather than merely permitting agency
 fee agreements-Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351
 U.S. 225 (1956)-and has, thus, treated the Act as
 raising constitutional questions. The other principal
 Railway Labor Act cases decided prior to Ellis are
 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) and Railway
 Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). The first agency
 fee case involving a public employer was Abood v.
 Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
 6431 U.S. at 220-26.
 7Id. at 222.
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 ideological purposes to which the fee
 payer is opposed. A public sector union
 receiving agency fees is not barred from
 spending funds for political purposes, but
 "the constitution requires . . . that such
 expenditures be financed from charges,
 dues, or assessments paid by employees
 who do not object to advancing those ideas
 and are not coerced into doing so against
 their will by the threat of loss of govern-
 mental employment."8 Thus, although the
 Supreme Court validated union collection
 and expenditure of agency fees to prevent
 "free riding" on collective bargaining
 benefits, workers are not deemed "free
 riders" when unions engage in political
 spending.
 Within this basic analytic framework,
 recent cases have focused on two issues:
 substantive limits on the use of the agency
 fee, and procedures necessary to protect
 those fee payers who object to the political
 uses to which their payments may be put.
 Substantive Limits on Fee Uses
 The line between financing collective
 bargaining and supporting political pro-
 grams will often be difficult to draw. Nor
 is it easy to classify the manifold union
 activities that are neither collective bargain-
 ing nor politics but rather fall between
 these extremes. Although there are brief
 references to this dilemma in the early
 agency fee cases, the first sustained effort
 to articulate a standard for testing the
 legitimacy of agency fee expenditures and
 applying that standard to specific activities
 came in 1984 in Ellis v. Railway Clerks.
 In Ellis, the Court held that the permis-
 sibility of union expenditures of agency
 fees turns on "whether the challenged
 expenditures are necessary or reasonably
 incurred for the purpose of performing
 the duties of an exclusive representative of
 the employees in dealing with the em-
 ployer on labor-management issues."9 In
 8Id. at 235-36.
 9 466 U.S. at 448. Ellis arose under the Railway
 Labor Act, and the Court's test was nominally a
 matter of statutory interpretation. Since the anti-free
 rider principle has been held to explain both
 applying this test to specific expenditures,
 the Court followed three criteria.
 First, agency fees may be used to
 finance activities that support the corpo-
 rate existence and operation of the union
 even though not directly connected to
 collective bargaining, as long as the activi-
 ties ultimately relate to the union's duties
 as a representative of the bargaining unit.
 Second, expenditures not connected to the
 representation of the bargaining unit,
 even when they strengthen the union and
 are not political or ideological, are not
 authorized if dissenters object. Finally, the
 Court would not be limited by the union's
 budget categories and distinguished repre-
 sentation-related spending from non-repr-
 esentation-related spending even within a
 particular category of union activity.
 Ellis upheld expenditures for three
 union functions-conventions, social activ-
 ities, and publications-that the Supreme
 Court deemed "activities or undertakings
 normally or reasonably employed to imple-
 ment or effectuate the duties of the union
 as exclusive representative of the employ-
 ees in the bargaining unit." The Court had
 "very little trouble" in finding conventions
 permissible: "Surely, if a union is to
 perform its statutory function, it must
 maintain its corporate or associational
 existence, must elect officers to manage
 and carry on its affairs, and may consult
 its members about overall bargaining goals
 and policies." Similarly, social activities, at
 least those in which expenses are held to a
 minimum, were deemed to be "sufficiently
 related" to collective bargaining and a
 "standard feature of union operations."
 Publications were seen as a reasonable
 method for the union to communicate
 with its constituents and were, thus,
 connected to the union's "representational
 obligations."10
 Congress's intention in authorizing the agency fee
 and its constitutional power to do so, the Ellis
 standard may also be of constitutional magnitude.
 Each of the expenditures the Ellis Court found
 covered by the anti-free rider rationale and autho-
 rized by Congress as a statutory matter was also
 found to withstand constitutional challenge.
 '1 Id. at 448-5 1.
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 The Court gave short shrift to the
 constitutional objections, perceiving "little
 additional infringement of First Amend-
 ment rights beyond that already accepted,
 and none that is not justified by the
 governmental interests behind the union
 shop itself." The Court, in effect, treated
 plaintiffs' objections to these expenditures
 as no more than objections to compulsory
 support of unions, which, when limited to
 "the realm of collective bargaining," stated
 no First Amendment violation."
 On the other hand, the Court readily
 determined that union organizing efforts
 and certain litigation expenses were not
 authorized. As the Court noted, if an
 agency shop agreement is in place, the
 union has already organized the bargain-
 ing unit. The focus of organizing activity
 would be either nonmembers within the
 unit or employees in other units. As to the
 former, the Court reasoned "it would be
 perverse" to permit the union "to charge
 to objecting non-members part of the costs
 of attempting to convince them to become
 members." 12 The organizing of other
 bargaining units was treated as similar to
 union political activity; whereas extra-unit
 organizing might be said to bolster the
 union as a bargaining representative by
 strengthening the union generally, the
 connection between extra-unit organizing
 and the representation of the dues payer
 was deemed to be too "attenuated" to be
 supportable. Moreover, like political activ-
 ity, extra-unit organizing was deemed to
 fall outside the free rider rationale. An
 anti-union employee could not be said to
 "free ride" on the benefits of expanded
 union strength if he did not view such
 expansion as a benefit.'3
 Similarly, the Court applied the princi-
 ple of representation of the bargaining
 unit to limit the extent to which nonunion
 employees may be charged for litigation
 expenses. Litigation costs "incident to
 negotiating and administering the con-
 tract or to settling grievances and disputes
 "Id. at 455-57.
 12 Id. at 452 n. 13.
 13 Id. at 451-53.
 arising in the bargaining unit," "fair
 representation litigation arising within the
 unit," "jurisdictional disputes with other
 unions," and "any other litigation before
 agencies or in courts that concern bargain-
 ing unit employees and normally con-
 ducted by the exclusive representative"
 may be charged to agency fee payers.
 "The expenses of litigation not having
 such a connection with the bargaining
 unit" may not be paid out of agency fees.
 In the Ellis case, which concerned clerical
 employees of Western Airlines, this exclu-
 sion meant that "objecting employees need
 not share the costs of the union's challenge
 to the legality of the airline industry
 mutual aid pact; of litigation seeking to
 protect the rights of airline employees
 generally during bankruptcy proceedings;
 or of defending suits alleging violation of
 . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964."14
 The Ellis Court's third theme, of pursu-
 ing the bargaining unit representation
 versus non-representation dichotomy
 through all expenditures and not simply
 relying on union expense categories, may
 be seen in the Court's treatment of
 publication costs. Although the Court
 generally upheld the use of agency fee
 money to fund publications, under the
 agency agreement at issue the union had
 agreed not to charge objecting employees
 for the portion of the union magazine
 devoted to "political causes." The Court
 stated that the union's voluntary limit on
 charges to objecting employees was "an
 important one":
 If the union cannot spend dissenters' funds for
 a particular activity, it has no justification for
 spending their funds for writing about that
 activity. By the same token, the Act surely
 allows it to charge objecting employees for
 reporting to them about those activities it can
 charge them for doing.'5
 The Court's treatment of litigation ex-
 penses is also clearly marked by the effort
 to allocate litigation costs between repre-
 '4 Id. at 453.
 '5 Id. at 451.
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 sentation-related and non-representation-
 related matters.'6
 Agency Fee Procedures
 The Court has addressed two proce-
 dural issues: What is the status of disputed
 agency fee payments pending resolution
 of the dissenter's claim to a right to
 withhold funds? How is a dissenter's
 objection to be presented and resolved?
 Status of contested fee payments. In Machin-
 ists v. Street and Railway Clerks v. Allen the
 Court indicated that dissenting employees'
 interests could be satisfied by "restitution
 to each individual employee of that por-
 tion of his money which the union
 expended, despite his notification, for the
 political causes to which he had advised
 the union he was opposed."'7 The political
 activities' share of the union's total budget
 would be calculated and the dissenting
 employee would be entitled to have re-
 turned the equivalent proportion of his
 agency fee.
 The Court's use of the term "restitu-
 tion" in these two Railway Labor Act cases
 suggested that the Act and, implicitly, the
 First Amendment, could be satisfied by an
 initial collection of agency fees subject to a
 later return of moneys equivalent to the
 dissenters' coerced political contribution.
 In Abood, the Court reviewed the Railway
 16 On the other hand, the Court's commitment to
 piercing budget categories and apportioning ex-
 penses did not extend to its discussion of the union
 convention. As Justice Powell pointed out in his
 separate opinion, a number of prominent politicians
 made speeches at the union's latest convention, and
 he read the Act and the First Amendment as denying
 the union the authority to use compulsory dues to
 defray that portion of the convention marked by
 such political activity. 466 U.S. at 459-61. Justice
 White, writing for the rest of the Court, however,
 permitted the union to apply agency fees to the costs
 of the convention without limitation and did not
 address Justice Powell's objection.
 In addition, the Court considered but did not
 decide whether the union could add agency fees to
 the general fund used to pay a $300 death benefit to
 the designated beneficiary of any member or
 nonmember required to pay dues or fees to the
 union. Id. at 453-55.
 17 367 U.S. at 775. See also 373 U.S. at 121.
 Labor Act decisions and referred to the
 ''appropriateness" of the remedies sketched
 in Street and Allen but did not pass directly
 on what remedy would suffice to protect
 the constitutional rights of public employ-
 ees paying the agency fee.18
 In Ellis and Hudson the Court changed
 its approach and held "the pure rebate
 approach is inadequate.'9 Under this new
 interpretation, the return of the political
 share of the agency fee, even with interest,
 did not mitigate effectively the harm done
 through the use of such moneys. Under a
 rebate scheme "the union obtains an
 involuntary loan for purposes to which the
 employee objects." The only justification
 for such coerced borrowing was "adminis-
 trative convenience." The existence of
 other administrative alternatives, such as
 advance reduction of dues or interest-
 bearing escrow accounts, eliminated any
 need for even a temporary use of dissent-
 ers' funds to subsidize political or ideolog-
 ical views they oppose.20
 In Hudson the Court cautioned that the
 escrow of 100 percent of a dissenter's dues
 payment is not constitutionally required.
 That requirement would deprive the
 union of access to some agency fee
 payments that it is "unquestionably enti-
 tled to retain."'2' If the union can establish
 the portion of the fee that is used for
 clearly authorized activities, there is no
 need to escrow that amount. But if the
 union chooses to escrow less than the
 entire agency fee paid by an objector, "it
 must carefully justify the limited escrow"
 on the basis of an independent audit of
 the union's expenditures.22
 Procedures for objectors. In Street, the
 Court placed the burden of taking the
 initial step in preventing the improper
 disbursement of funds on the objecting
 employee: "[D]issent is not to be pre-
 sumed-it must affirmatively be made
 18 431 U.S. at 237-42.
 19 466 U.S. at 443.
 20 Id. at 444.
 21 106 S.Ct. at 1078.
 22 Id. at n. 23.
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 known to the union."23 The union has the
 right to collect agency fees and to spend
 them for any lawful purpose, including
 ideological or political activities, until an
 employee specifically notifies the union of
 his objection to the use of his money for
 such activity. In Allen, the Court eased the
 dissenter's notice burden by holding that
 an employee's general statement of oppo-
 sition to any political expenditures by the
 union would suffice to give notice; objec-
 tion to particular expenditures would not
 be required.24
 Ellis and Hudson continued to place the
 burden of initial objection on the dissent-
 ing employee, but Hudson held the union
 is obligated to give potential objectors
 "sufficient information to gauge the pro-
 priety of the union's fee."25 The union
 must disclose to nonmembers some infor-
 mation concerning the uses to which the
 fee is put as a precondition to the
 collection of the fee. Moreover, Hudson
 mandated that once an expenditure is
 objected to, the burden of proving the
 proportion of political to total union
 expenditures is on the union.26
 Finally, Hudson added the new proce-
 dural requirement that employee objec-
 tions receive a prompt hearing by an
 impartial decision-maker. The Court was
 sharply critical of the procedure provided
 by the Chicago Teachers Union in the
 Hudson case: an initial consideration of the
 dissenter's objection by a union official,
 review by the union executive committee
 and executive board, and, as a final step,
 review by a union-selected arbitrator. The
 union's internal review procedure was
 fatally flawed because it was "entirely
 controlled by the union, which is an
 interested party."27 The Court rejected
 the union's contention that "ordinary
 judicial remedies"-namely, a civil suit in
 state court-would suffice to protect an
 objector's interests. Review by union offi-
 cials and a union-selected arbitrator failed
 23 367 U.S. at 774.
 24 373 U.S. at 118-19.
 25 106 S.Ct. at 1076.
 26 Id. at 1075, quoting Allen, 373 U.S. at 122.
 27 Id. at 1077.
 for lack of impartiality; requiring a dis-
 senter to seek vindication in court was not
 adequate to meet the requirement of a
 "reasonably prompt" decision unless the
 state chose to provide an "extraordinarily
 swift judicial review" for dissenter chal-
 lenges.28 The Court did not require any
 specific procedure, but underlined the
 need for an "expeditious, fair and objec-
 tive" mechanism that would facilitate
 nonmember employees' ability to protect
 their rights.29
 Ellis and Hudson are striking in their
 renewed emphasis on the First Amend-
 ment basis for the dissenter's rights, the
 burden on the union to prove that
 contested expenditures are representation-
 related and not merely non-political, and
 the extension of First Amendment con-
 cerns to procedural questions. Underlying
 the Court's requirements of notice of
 union spending, advance reduction or
 escrow, and prompt review by an impar-
 tial decision-maker is its concern that the
 agency fee-even when justified by the
 governmental concern to prevent "free
 riders"-impinges on First Amendment
 rights and that procedures protecting the
 interests of dissenting employees are, thus,
 constitutionally mandated.
 The New York Agency Shop
 Fee Deduction
 Authorization for the Deduction
 The New York State Legislature first
 authorized the agency shop fee in 1977
 when it amended section 208 of the Civil
 Service Law. Subsection 3(a) of Section
 208 provides that public employee organi-
 zations recognized or certified as exclusive
 representatives of negotiating units repre-
 senting most state employees "shall be
 entitled to have deducted from the wage
 or salary of the employees in such negoti-
 ating unit who are not members of said
 employee organization the amount equiv-
 alent to the dues levied by such employee
 organization" and to have that deduction
 transmitted to the employee organization.
 28 Id. at 1076-77 n. 20.
 29 Id. at 1076.
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 Subsection 3(b) provides that unions rep-
 resenting local government employees are
 "entitled to negotiate" for the agency shop
 fee arrangement.
 Section 208(3) also contains a proviso
 that limits the applicability of the agency
 shop fee deduction to those employee
 organizations that have
 established and maintained a procedure provid-
 ing for the refund to any employee demanding
 the return of any part of an agency shop fee
 deduction which represents the employee's pro
 rata share of expenditures by the organization
 in aid of activities or causes of a political or
 ideological nature only incidentally related to
 terms or conditions of employment.
 PERB has consistently held that the
 establishment and maintenance of a valid
 refund procedure is a "statutory prerequi-
 site" for the "grant of a long-withheld
 privilege."30 PERB has asserted the author-
 ity to order the return of agency shop
 deductions as a remedy when a union has
 failed to establish and maintain a valid
 refund procedure, and that assertion has
 been upheld by the courts.3'
 Substantive Limitations on
 the Uses of Agency Shop Fees
 Section 208(3) on its face requires that a
 refund be available only for expenditures
 in support of "activities or causes of a
 political or ideological nature only inciden-
 tally related to terms and conditions of
 employment." There is no state judicial or
 PERB gloss on the meaning of the quoted
 language and no cases directly deciding
 which activities or causes are "political or
 ideological" and which are not within the
 30 United University Professions, Inc. (Eson), 11
 PERB Para. 3068 (1978). Prior to enactment of
 section 208(3), the New York courts had upheld
 PERB's finding that the agency fee violated the Civil
 Service Law's guarantee to public employees of the
 right to refrain from joining in employee organiza-
 tions. Matter of Farrigan v. Helsby, 42 AD2d 265 (3d
 Dept. 1973).
 31 Public Employees Federation v. PERB, 93 AD2d
 910 (3d Dept. 1983) (upholding PERB power to
 order refund, although modifying particular refund
 order); United University Professions, Inc. v. Newman,
 86 A.D.2d 734 (3d Dept.), lv. app. den. 56 NY2d 504
 (1982).
 meaning of the refund proviso.32 In
 particular, there has been no reported
 consideration of whether the phrase "only
 incidentally related to terms and condi-
 tions of employment" limits the political
 activities refund so that political or ideo-
 logical expenditures that are directly re-
 lated to terms and conditions of employ-
 ment are not refundable; or whether all
 "activities or causes of a political or
 ideological nature" within the meaning of
 the statute are by definition only inciden-
 tally related to terms and conditions of
 employment.
 PERB and the courts have given indi-
 rect attention to the issue of whether
 agency fee moneys may be used to fund
 union benefit programs, such as insur-
 ance, medical, or accidental death and
 dismemberment policies. PERB has held
 that where agency fee payments are used
 to defray the cost of such programs
 nonunion employees who are compelled
 to contribute must also be entitled to the
 benefit or the union will be required to
 refund their contribution.33 Although the
 union's right to use the agency fee for
 such purposes was not discussed, such a
 use appears to have been implicitly up-
 held.34 Similarly, the only requirement
 32 In Handy v. Westbury Teachers Ass'n, 104 AD2d
 923, 926 (2d Dept. 1984), the Court found that an
 employee's claim that section 208(3) permits the
 union to use agency shop fees for purposes other
 than collective bargaining in violation of the First
 Amendment stated a proper cause of action but that
 the record was insufficient to permit an adjudication
 of the merits.
 3 See, e.g., United University Professions, Inc.
 (Eson), 12 PERB Para. 3117 (1979), aff'd Matter of
 United University Professions, Inc. v. Newman, 80 AD2d
 23, 26 (3d Dept. 1981); United Federation of
 Teachers, Local 2 (Barnett), 16 PERB Para. 3052
 (1983).
 34 In Eson, the Board held that the use of agency
 fee payments to secure insurance benefits solely for
 members of the union interfered with, restrained,
 and coerced the employee in the exercise of his right
 not to join or participate in a union, in violation of
 section 209-a (2)(e) of the Civil Service Law. The
 Board deemed it "not necessary to determine"
 whether insurance benefits were a permissible use of
 union dues. The Board's order indicated that
 providing benefits to all dues payers-union mem-
 bers and nonmembers-would cure the violations.
 Similarly, in Barnett, the Board treated the union's
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 PERB imposed on a union that allocates
 agency fee payments to the support of its
 publications was to take reasonable efforts
 to make available to fee-payers those
 publications providing "substantial eco-
 nomic or job-related benefit to unit em-
 ployees s35
 Although PERB has never expressly
 addressed the issue of agency fee money
 for union benefit programs, these cases
 suggest that for purposes of section 208(3)
 there may be no gray area between
 political activity and collective bargain-
 ing-all union activities that are not
 political or ideological (and arguably some
 that are) may be funded out of the agency
 fee and are not refundable to dissenting
 employees.
 Procedures for Implementing
 the Fee Deduction
 Status of contested fee payments. In 1978, in
 United University Professions, Inc. (Eson),36
 PERB held that the refund requirement
 of section 208(3) could be satisfied by a
 union procedure of collecting agency shop
 fees during the course of its fiscal year and
 refunding to objecting employees their
 pro rata share of expenditures in support
 of political and ideological causes after the
 end of the fiscal year. In 1984, following
 Ellis, PERB overruled UUP(Eson). The
 Board initially determined that section
 defense that it was providing insurance to a
 nonmember dues payer as an adequate defense to an
 improper practice charge. The validity of the union's
 practice of using dues to pay for insurance benefits
 was not challenged.
 In the Appellate Division's affirmance of Eson, the
 court ruled that the Board's requirement that either
 the benefits be equitably provided or the non-
 member dues payer receive a refund was reasonable,
 "particularly when redress through the refund
 mechanism would not be available unless the
 challenged funding was for political or ideological
 activity." 80 AD2d at 26. Implicitly, then, insurance
 benefits were not "political or ideological activity"
 and therefore not unauthorized by section 208(3) so
 long as they were equitably provided to all dues
 payers.
 35 United Federation of Teachers, Local 2 (Barn-
 ett), 17 PERB Para. 3023 (1984).
 36 1 PERB Para. 3068 (1978); 11 PERB Para.
 3074 (1978).
 208(3) required an escrow in an interest-
 bearing account of 100 percent of the
 agency shop fee of nonmembers who
 object to political spending.37
 PERB then changed its position in 1985
 and held that section 208(3) could be
 satisfied by the advance reduction of a
 portion of an objector's fee. In United
 University Professions, Inc. (Barry),38 the
 Board considered a challenge to a union
 procedure that provided for advance
 reduction of an annual fee. The reduction
 was based on the union's approximation
 of the expenditures it and its affiliates
 would make during that year for refund-
 able activities. That approximation, in
 turn, was based on the union's expendi-
 tures during the latest fiscal year for which
 there was a completed and available audit.
 After a year-end audit, the actual expen-
 ditures for refundable purposes were
 calculated and adjustments to the advance
 reduction made as appropriate. PERB
 dismissed the contention that any refund
 procedure that failed to provide for a 100
 percent escrow was invalid on its face and
 held that "the statute does not mandate
 any particular form of procedure" and
 "should be construed as permitting any
 refund procedure . . . which affords
 appropriate protection to the interests of
 non-members."39
 Although it did not specifically approve
 the UUP advance reduction method, the
 Board held that advance reduction of a
 portion of the fee could suffice. The
 Board noted that when assessing the
 validity of a particular advance reduction
 procedure, "the basis upon which the
 amount of the advance reduction is deter-
 mined" would be an important factor, but
 it did not comment on the basis used in
 the plan before it, nor did it address the
 fact that under the union plan, part of the
 refundable portion of the objector's dues
 would be temporarily used by the union.
 Procedures for objectors. PERB has con-
 strued section 208(3) to place the initial
 3 United University Professions, Inc. (Barry), 17
 PERB Para. 3098 (1984).
 38 18 PERB Para. 3063 (1985).
 39 Id.
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 burden of objecting to union spending on
 the nonmember, although "an expression
 of generalized opposition to political or
 ideological expenditures unrelated to col-
 lective bargaining is all that may be
 demanded in a refund procedure."40
 Moreover, the union is required "to
 provide timely notice of its refund proce-
 dure to all persons paying an agency shop
 fee."'4' When an employee objects to the
 use of an agency shop fee, the union must
 bear the burden of justifying its assess-
 ment and establishing that the fees are not
 being expended for impermissible pur-
 poses, and this burden extends to funds a
 local union has forwarded to its national
 or state affiliates.42
 PERB has held that a union must
 provide objectors with "an itemized, au-
 dited statement of the complete receipts
 and expenditures of the union and any of
 its affiliates which receive, either directly
 or indirectly, any portion of its revenues"
 from the union's agency fees, together
 with the basis for the union's determina-
 tion of the amount of the refund, includ-
 ing identification of those items of ex-
 pense determined by the union and its
 affiliates to be refundable.43 The duty to
 provide financial information applies
 whether or not the objector has requested
 such information.44
 Although most unions have provided
 objectors with an internal appeals proce-
 dure-typically involving two appellate
 steps within the union hierarchy and a
 third and final step of decision by a
 neutral appointed by the union-PERB
 has held that neither the appointment of a
 neutral nor any other internal union
 procedure, other than the opportunity to
 apply for a refund, is mandated. Rather,
 40 Warner v. Board of Education, 99 Misc. 2d 251,
 258 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co. 1979).
 "' Public Employees Federation (Kahn), 15 PERB
 Para. 3011 (1982).
 42 Warner v. Board of Education, supra, 99 Misc. 2d
 at 258, 259.
 43 United University Professions, Inc. (Barry), 13
 PERB Para. 3090 (1980).
 44 Professional Staff Congress (Rothstein), 15 PERB
 Para. 3012 (1982). Failure to provide financial
 information may result in a refund of the objector's
 entire agency fee payment.
 PERB has stated that the opportunity for a
 "plenary action in court" can satisfy an
 objector's right to an impartial review of
 the union's decision.45
 Where an appellate procedure is pro-
 vided, however, PERB has passed on its
 sufficiency. Thus, PERB has held that
 such a procedure must be "expeditious"-
 with "expeditious" defined as requiring a
 final decision within one year of the
 objection.46 Any appellate procedures must
 have jurisdiction over agency fees for-
 warded to a union's affiliates.47 The union
 must absorb the cost of resort to the
 neutral; an early attempt to require the
 objecting employee to pay one-half of the
 neutral's costs was rejected.48 On the other
 hand, the union may have a free hand in
 selecting the neutral, and the union may
 request the neutral to have the hearing at
 a particular site that is more convenient to
 the union than to the objector, so long as it
 remains reasonably accessible to the objec-
 tor.49
 PERB will not review the conduct or
 rulings of the neutral. In Hampton Bays
 Teachers Ass'n,50 PERB ruled that it lacked
 jurisdiction to review the correctness of
 the amount of the refund. PERB drew an
 analogy between the question of the
 amount of the refund and the right to a
 particular benefit promised by a collec-
 tively negotiated agreement: The Legisla-
 ture had denied the Board jurisdiction to
 consider alleged violations of an agree-
 ment; by implication, the Board stated, it
 lacked jurisdiction to consider the amount
 of the refund. Thereafter, the Board
 extended Hampton Bays to bar all review of
 the conduct or rulings of the neutral, "as
 they are essentially a part of the challenge
 "4 Hampton Bays Teachers Ass'n, 14 PERB Para.
 3018 (1981).
 46 United University Professions, Inc. (Eson), 12
 PERB Para. 3093 (1979). Undue delay may be
 grounds for a refund. United University Professions,
 Inc. (Barry), 16 PERB Para. 3040 (1983).
 47 United University Professions, Inc. (Eson), 11
 PERB Para. 3068 (1978) and 11 PERB Para. 3072
 (1978).
 48 Id.
 49 United University Professions, Inc. (Barry), 17
 PERB Para. 3031 (1984).
 30 Hampton Bays Teachers Ass'n, supra note 45.
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 to the correctness of the amount of the
 refund."'5' The actions of the neutral and
 the sufficiency of the refund may only be
 challenged in a plenary court action.
 The New York Agency Shop Fee
 Deduction After Ellis and Hudson
 Substantive Limitations on the
 Uses of the Fee
 In Ellis, as noted above, the Supreme
 Court invalidated the use of agency
 payments for certain nonpolitical and
 nonideological activities, including union
 organizing expenditures, litigation ex-
 penses connected to a union challenge to
 an industry-wide employee mutual aid
 pact, union litigation of the rights of
 employees generally during bankruptcy
 proceedings, and the union's defense of
 civil rights suits. As such, Ellis is more
 restrictive than New York's authorization
 to unions, in Section 208(3), to use fees for
 all purposes other than those "activities or
 causes of a political or ideological nature
 only incidentally related to terms and
 conditions of employment."
 Admittedly, Ellis's treatment of those
 expenses was only for the purpose of
 assessing whether they were authorized by
 the Railway Labor Act, and the Court's
 holding with respect to the organizing and
 litigation expenses was limited to a deter-
 mination that there was no statutory
 authorization. Nevertheless, the Court's
 discussion of these fee uses, and its
 emphasis that agency fee moneys be
 limited to purposes connected to the
 union's organizational existence and its
 representation functions, was built around
 an attempt to mark out the scope of the
 anti-free rider rationale and is, thus,
 clearly of constitutional dimension.
 It is not certain how far Ellis's tightening
 up on the permissible uses of agency fees
 is to apply in the public sector. As the
 Court recognized in Abood, the line be-
 tween representation-related and non-
 representation-related expenditures "may
 5' United University Professions, Inc. (Barry), 14
 PERB Para. 3099 (1981).
 be somewhat hazier" in the public sector
 than in the private. Abood acknowledged
 that the achievement of union goals in the
 public sector "may require not merely
 concord at the bargaining table, but
 subsequent approval by other public au-
 thorities; related budgetary and appropri-
 ation decisions might be seen as an
 integral part of the bargaining process."52
 The Court declined to attempt to define
 the scope of representation-related public
 sector expenditures, but other courts have
 permitted unions to use agency fees for
 legislative lobbying activities "pertinent to
 the duties of the union as a bargaining
 representative. 53
 Ellis and Abood, thus, send conflicting
 signals concerning permissible union uses
 of agency fees. One solution to this
 problem would be for PERB to issue
 guidelines indicating which expenditures
 may be properly charged to nonmembers
 and which may not. Such interpretive
 guidelines could serve two important
 functions.
 Section 208(3), as written, presumes that
 all union expenditures other than political
 or ideological activity "only incidentally
 related" to labor concerns will be permit-
 ted. Although the distinction between
 collective bargaining and political activity
 is, at best, elusive in the public sector
 (Rehmus and Kerner: 1980; Sum-
 mers: 1975), it is the distinction the Su-
 preme Court insists upon. Ellis indicates
 that agency fee legislation may only
 authorize representation-related expendi-
 tures, and section 208(3)'s broad language
 may have to be narrowed to survive Ellis.
 On the other hand, given Abood's recogni-
 tion that some political activity is indeed
 intertwined with public sector bargaining,
 interpretive guidelines could serve the
 vital purpose of educating the courts as to
 how and when union lobbying, legislative,
 public information, and other arguably
 political activities serve legitimate bargain-
 ing goals. In other words, interpretation
 52 431 U.S. at 236.
 53 See, e.g., Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d
 Cir. 1984); Board of Education v. Boonton Education
 Ass'n, 494 A.2d 279 (N.J. 1985).
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 by an expert agency could both help tailor
 the statute to constitutional norms and, by
 informing a reviewing court as to how
 those constitutional norms ought to be
 applied given the realities of public sector
 collective bargaining, permit the applica-
 tion of the statute in a manner consistent
 with the actual practice of public employer-
 employee relations.
 PERB, however, has so far declined to
 pass on the substantive propriety of
 agency fee expenditures, claiming it lacks
 jurisdiction to consider the standards used
 by a union in determining the amount of a
 refund.54 The Board has similarly de-
 clined to pass on the substantive rulings of
 the union-appointed neutral, and the
 courts have deferred to the agency's
 interpretation of its jurisdiction.55
 PERB's determination that it lacks juris-
 diction to pass on the substantive dimen-
 sions of the agency shop refund is
 unpersuasive. Unlike the review of dis-
 putes under a collective agreement, review
 of the merits of a refund claim is not
 expressly barred by statute. The standards
 for use of the agency fee involve statutory
 interpretation of the Civil Service Law-a
 subject of PERB expertise-not contract
 interpretation. Moreover, the adequacy of
 the refund procedure, which is a statutory
 prerequisite to the agency shop fee deduc-
 tion, turns in part on whether the proce-
 dure yields substantively proper results.
 The value of guidelines that could
 interpret the statute in order to save it and
 could educate the courts in future consti-
 tutional challenges argues for PERB's
 reconsideration of its current unwilling-
 ness to look into the correctness of a
 refund. If PERB continues to adhere to its
 current analysis of its jurisdiction, the only
 way to meet any doubts about the scope of
 the agency fee authorization will be to
 amend the statute or to await the results of
 a federal court challenge.
 5" East Moriches Teachers Ass'n, 14 PERB Para.
 3056 (1981).
 55 Bodanza v. PERB, 128 Misc. 2d 786 (1985), aff'd
 119 AD2d 917 (3d Dept.), lv. app. den. 68 NY2d 607
 (1986).
 The Refund Mechanism
 PERB has not mandated any specific
 refund mechanism. Instead, it has inter-
 preted the statute to allow either an
 escrow or an advance reduction of dues-
 the two methods presented by the Su-
 preme Court-and has stated it will
 proceed on a case-by-case basis in assess-
 ing whether a particular refund mecha-
 nism adequately protects dissenters' inter-
 ests.
 PERB has indicated that a 100 percent
 escrow or cessation of all dues collection
 will not be required. Although this posi-
 tion is consistent with Hudson's holding
 that a 100 percent escrow is not constitu-
 tionally necessary, a partial escrow leaves
 open the possibility of a nonmember's
 overpayment, which would not be re-
 funded until the following year. This
 contingency was apparent on the face of
 the union plan recently reviewed by the
 Board in UUP (Barry).56 Though the
 Supreme Court has maintained that "abso-
 lute precision in the calculation of the
 charge to non-members cannot be ex-
 pected or required"57 and has stated that a
 union "cannot be faulted for calculating its
 fee on the basis of its expenses during the
 preceding year,"58 the Court has also
 emphasized that even the temporary im-
 proper use of a small coerced contribution
 infringes First Amendment rights.59
 One approach that would permit a
 partial escrow while protecting dissenters'
 interests would be to require any union
 using a partial escrow plan to add to its
 base year calculation of rebatable expendi-
 tures a "cushion" or margin of safety-a
 specific increment of 5 percent or 10
 percent or 15 percent. A single "cushion"
 could be required for all unions, or a
 different cushion for different unions or
 categories of unions. The cushion could
 be based on an examination of the
 volatility of union budgets-for example,
 how dramatically has the political portion
 56 See text at notes 38 and 39, supra.
 57 Id. at 1076 n. 18 (quoting Railway Clerks v. Allen,
 373 U.S. at 122).
 58 Id.
 59 Id. at 1075.
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 of union expenditures changed from year
 to year? Is last year's political share a
 reasonably good predictor of this year's?
 The cushion could also be based not on
 the prior year's budget but on the highest
 percentage the union has ever devoted to
 political activity.
 Given the importance of the rights at
 stake, the benefits of avoiding the consump-
 tion of time and energy in protracted
 litigation, and the kinds of data that would
 go into making the "cushion" determina-
 tion, a rule-making proceeding would be
 desirable. A PERB rule could either set or
 require a specific percentage addition to
 the base year political percentage to be
 added by all unions, or it could provide a
 formula each union could use in calculat-
 ing its particular margin of safety.
 Fair Notice of the Right to a Refund
 PERB has required unions to give fee
 payers notice of the procedure for a
 refund. PERB has also required the union
 to provide objectors with a detailed finan-
 cial statement of its receipts and expendi-
 tures and those of its affiliates and the
 basis for its determination of the amount
 of the refund. Hudson indicates that those
 two steps will have to be combined into
 one-that financial information sufficient
 to gauge the propriety of the union's fee
 has to be provided before the fee is
 collected and spent. In Hudson the Court
 held that "leaving the non-union employ-
 ees in the dark about the source of the
 figure for the agency fee-and requiring
 them to object in order to receive informa-
 tion" is inadequate to protect nonmem-
 bers' First Amendment rights.60
 This pre-objection disclosure of finan-
 cial information need not be as detailed as
 the financial information currently re-
 quired to be provided to objectors, but
 constitutionally mandated disclosure surely
 would include the major categories of
 expenses, as well as verification by an
 independent auditor.6' Disclosure would
 also have to apply to the activities of
 60 106 S. Ct. at 1076.
 61 Id. at n. 18.
 affiliated state and national labor organi-
 zations that receive agency shop fee
 moneys from a union.62
 Review by an Impartial
 Decision-Maker
 Hudson establishes that an agency shop
 fee procedure must include a "reasonably
 prompt decision by an impartial decision-
 maker" on objections by nonunion employ-
 ees. The Court held that neither union
 procedures consisting of internal appeals
 and reference to a union-selected arbitra-
 tor nor ordinary judicial remedies are
 sufficient to meet this requirement. Thus,
 Hudson treated as constitutionally inade-
 quate the kind of objection procedure that
 PERB has found satisfactory for purposes
 of section 208(3). PERB has repeatedly
 upheld as valid union appeals proce-
 dures-including two steps of review by
 internal union boards or committees and a
 third step of review by a union-selected
 arbitrator-closely resembling the union
 internal remedy ruled out in Hudson.
 PERB has also taken the position that
 section 208(3) does not require any review
 of an objector's claims other than that
 available in an ordinary court action-a
 position that Hudson found insufficient to
 protect the rights of objectors.
 If section 208(3) is to survive constitu-
 tional challenge in the wake of Hudson, it
 will have to be reinterpreted to require
 prompt review by an impartial decision-
 maker of the objector's refund claim prior
 to any judicial review. This review may not
 be carried out by a union-selected arbitra-
 tor. It may, however, still be conducted in
 arbitration proceedings as long as the
 selection of the arbitrator does not repre-
 sent the union's "unrestricted choice."63
 Hudson leaves open the possibility of an
 arbitration remedy if the arbitrator is not
 selected by the union alone. Arbitrators
 selected by the union and the objecting
 62 Id.
 63 106 S. Ct. at 1077 n. 21. In light of Hudson,
 PERB's rulings that the union may select the site of
 the arbitration and may group numerous objections
 into one hearing also become questionable.
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 nonmember jointly, either by PERB or
 from a permanent list maintained by an
 arbitration organization approved for this
 purpose by PERB, might suffice.
 Hudson also casts doubt on the validity
 of union procedures requiring two inter-
 nal steps prior to resort to the arbitrator.
 Both steps are "initially controlled by the
 union which is an interested party"64 and
 thus are not consistent with the due
 process required by the First Amendment.
 Moreover, requiring the exhaustion of
 internal appeals delays the presentation of
 the objector's complaint to an impartial
 decision-maker. Such delay is at odds with
 the requirement of prompt action.65
 It is also doubtful whether the Court's
 requirement of "expeditious" review is
 satisfied by the current PERB rulings
 giving a union up to a year to reach a final
 decision on a nonmember's objections.
 The opinion does not present any time
 deadline, but a year seems a long time to
 wait. PERB will have to tighten the
 timetable for an arbitrator's review.
 Finally, PERB must consider what role,
 if any, it can take in the review of
 objectors' claims. Although the Supreme
 Court in Hudson drew back from imposing
 a "full-dress administrative hearing, with
 evidentiary safeguards" as a constitutional
 mandate, an administrative agency could
 play an important role in resolving the
 questions raised by objectors' claims.
 Among the likely questions are what
 expenses may be taxed to objectors and
 how the share of union expenses not
 chargeable to objectors should be calcu-
 lated. What is the proper union budgetary
 base? Is the union's financial statement
 properly prepared, certified, and audited?
 Are affiliated unions properly included?
 These questions are likely to occur in
 many cases, and unions and objectors alike
 would benefit from the greater consis-
 64 Id. at 1077.
 65Justice White's concurring opinion, joined by
 Chief Justice Burger, stated that a complaining
 nonmember should not be required to exhaust
 internal union procedures before going to arbitra-
 tion. Id. at 1078.
 tency in the answers that an administrative
 determination would provide.
 Moreover, the resolution of these issues
 will to a significant degree require legal
 determinations, including the constitution-
 ality of permitting objectors to be charged
 certain expenses, assuring the indepen-
 dence of the decision-maker reviewing
 reduction claims, and the procedural
 sufficiency of the standards for calculating
 the agency fee share. An administrative
 agency should be involved in making these
 determinations either by articulating rules
 for the selection and guidance of neutrals,
 hearing and determining the contested
 cases, or reviewing the neutral's rulings.
 As previously discussed, PERB has
 taken the position that whereas it may pass
 on the structure of a union's internal
 refund procedures, it lacks jurisdiction to
 review the accuracy of the refund itself.
 But substance and procedure are closely
 intertwined in such questions. Hudson's
 procedures flow directly from the substan-
 tive rights held to be at stake, and a part of
 the procedure required is an independent
 determination by an impartial decision-
 maker prior to a union's use of contested
 fee payments. A contested agency fee
 payment is not analogous to a contested
 benefit under a collective agreement-the
 analogy PERB has drawn in justifying its
 noninvolvement in the review of the
 correctness of refunds. There is neither a
 statutory nor a constitutional interest in
 determining whether a particular benefit
 is paid or not paid; it is entirely a matter of
 private agreement between the employer
 and the union. By contrast, as Ellis and
 Hudson demonstrate, there is a significant
 constitutional interest in whether a partic-
 ular expense is properly charged to a
 nonmember and in the procedures for
 considering a nonmember's refund claim.
 Conclusion
 The analysis in this paper suggests that
 Ellis and Hudson require PERB to take a
 more activist stance in policing the agency
 fee and protecting nonunion employee
 rights. PERB will have to issue guidelines,
 tracking Ellis's representation-relatedness
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 standard and indicating what types of
 expenditures may be charged to nonmem-
 bers and what types may not; and PERB
 will have to take steps to assure that
 objectors are accorded procedural fair-
 ness.
 These developments are fully consistent
 with the doctrinal framework articulated
 in Abood and the earlier Railway Labor Act
 cases. The Court's grounding of the
 agency fee in the anti-free rider principle
 tends to focus the range of permissible fee
 uses around collective bargaining. Its
 determination that agency fee payments
 impinge on constitutional rights implies
 the need for procedures that effectively
 protect objecting fee payers. Even though
 these conclusions flow naturally from the
 logic of the earlier cases, however, they
 raise new problems.
 In Hudson, the agency shop fee deduc-
 tion is viewed as a benefit authorized and
 implemented by the state and affecting
 the First Amendment interests of fee-
 payers, and the Court has put the burden
 on the state to implement standards and
 procedures to protect the interests of
 objectors. Yet, in New York at least, the
 state agency with primary responsibility
 for public sector relations may not be
 comfortable with this task. PERB's deci-
 sions over the last decade indicate that it
 has little desire to engage in close review
 of the agency shop fee. PERB has gener-
 ally declined to pass on the propriety of
 fee uses, to indicate clearly how the
 statutory requirement of a refund to
 objectors is to be satisfied, or to pass on
 the conduct or rulings of the union-
 appointed neutrals who have heard objec-
 tors' appeals. PERB's conclusion that it
 lacks jurisdiction to pass on the correct-
 ness of the amount of the refund is
 unpersuasive as an interpretation of the
 Civil Service Law but highly indicative of
 the Board's reluctance to become en-
 meshed in the issues raised by the agency
 shop fee.
 PERB, like its counterpart agencies in
 other states, may be better suited to its
 primary mission of refereeing employer-
 union disputes than to vindicating the
 interests of nonunion employees. Ellis and
 (especially) Hudson thus create a sharp
 institutional dilemma for the Board. Its
 traditional statutory mandate requires it to
 maintain the confidence of public sector
 unions in order to be effective, whereas its
 new constitutional duties would force it to
 advance the position of objecting nonunion-
 ists at the expense of unions. Compelled to
 treat both public sector unions and non-
 union employees as constituents in a
 context where the public employer has
 relatively little at stake and may, indeed,
 favor the union position as productive of
 peace and stability, the Board may be a
 hesitant champion of the nonunion em-
 ployee's First Amendment rights. But
 there do not seem to be any other
 candidates available to serve as defenders
 of nonunionists' rights, and the Supreme
 Court has made the adequate defense of
 those rights the prerequisite to the state's
 authorization of public sector agency fees.
 A reluctant state labor agency may be
 inadequate to the task newly mandated by
 the Supreme Court, but an aggressive
 agency could create other problems in
 terms of the autonomy of public sector
 unions. The promulgation and enforce-
 ment of substantive guidelines and proce-
 dures to protect objecting nonunionists
 necessarily entails state scrutiny of union
 operational and budgetary decisions. How
 public sector unions spend money in the
 course of bargaining, lobbying, and litiga-
 tion against public employers, and how
 these unions allocate expenditures be-
 tween the representation-related and
 non-representation-related categories,
 must now become subject to some form of
 state agency review. Union spending deci-
 sions will have to be made with PERB, or
 some other state body, in effect, looking
 over the union's shoulder.
 The dilemma of having a state agency
 pass on how unions pursue these goals in
 conflicts with other state agencies may be
 inherent in the institutional position of
 state labor relations agencies, but the
 potential threat to union autonomy and
 effectiveness seems greater when the state
 labor board is authorized, indeed re-
 quired, to review union budgetary deci-
 sions.
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 These institutional difficulties in imple-
 menting Ellis and Hudson derive, at bot-
 tom, from the Supreme Court's require-
 ment, articulated in Abood, that unions,
 labor boards, and courts be able to
 separate representation and bargaining
 from politics. Such differentiation is diffi-
 cult even in the case of private sector
 unions. As the Supreme Court once
 acknowledged in the private sector con-
 text, "[L]abor's cause often is advanced on
 fronts other than collective bargaining and
 grievance settlement within the immediate
 employment context."66 In the public
 sector, the separation may be impossible to
 effect: "[C]ollective bargaining in the
 public sector is inherently political in any
 event.. . Public sector unions' very right
 to organize and bargain, to say nothing of
 their ability to achieve significant gains
 through negotiations, inescapably involves
 political activity" (Rehmus and Kerner
 1980:99).
 In Abood the Supreme Court sought to
 recognize and reconcile the interests of
 unions and objecting employees-and the
 perspectives of collective bargaining and
 the First Amendment-through this dis-
 tinction between politics and representa-
 tion. What the distinction appeared to lack
 in logic it seemed to make up for in
 66 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978).
 pragmatic result: unions could collect fees
 so long as those fees were spent on
 representation and not politics. But the
 equilibrium of rights in Abood was achieved
 only through the Court's suspension of
 consideration of how the politics/represen-
 tation distinction is to be drawn and
 enforced in actual cases. The Court's
 subsequent attention to the substance of
 that distinction in Ellis and the procedures
 for its vindication in Hudson resulted in a
 shifting in the balance of interests in favor
 of the objecting nonunion employee. Ellis
 and-especially-Hudson indicate that the
 Court's agency fee doctrine is increasingly
 driven by First Amendment concerns.
 As the analysis in this study suggests, the
 full vindication of the Court's expanded
 view of objecting employees' First Amend-
 ment rights will turn on a strengthened
 role for state labor relations agencies like
 PERB. The irony apparent in predicating
 an enhanced government role on indi-
 vidual rights concerns may be overshad-
 owed only by the difficulty of the task for
 state labor regulators: to be vigorous
 protectors of the rights of objecting
 employees without infringing on union
 autonomy and the rights of union work-
 ers. Only time, and future litigation, will
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